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Abstract—Efficient and reliable access control in smart cities
is critical for the protection of various resources for decision
making and task execution. Existing centralized access control
schemes suffer from the limitations of single point of failure, low
reliability and poor scalability. This paper therefore proposes a
distributed and reliable access control framework for smart cities
by combining the blockchain smart contract technology and the
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) model. The framework
consists of one Policy Management Contract (PMC) for managing
the ABAC policies, one Subject Attribute Management Contract
(SAMC) for managing the attributes of subjects (i.e., entities
accessing resources), one Object Attribute Management Contract
(OAMC) for managing the attributes of objects (i.e., resources
being accessed), and one Access Control Contract (ACC) for
performing the access control. To show the feasibility of the
proposed framework, we construct a local private Ethereum
blockchain system to implement the four smart contracts and
also conduct experiments to evaluate the monetary cost as well
as to compare the proposed framework with an existing Access
Control List (ACL)-based scheme. The experimental results show
that although the proposed scheme consumes more money than
the ACL-based scheme at the deployment stage, it introduces less
monetary cost during the system running especially for large-
scale smart cities.
Index Terms—Smart cities, attribute-based access control,
blockchain, smart contract.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Research Problem
THANKS to the rapid development of communication andmanufacturing technologies, the Internet of Things (IoT)
has been expanding at an unprecedented speed in last decades
[2]. Smart city, which brings intelligence to various aspects of
our life such as healthcare, logistic and transportation, has been
recognized as a representative IoT application. To actualize
the vision of smart cities, a huge amount of resources (e.g.,
sensors, actuators and data) need to be deployed in cities to
facilitate decision making and task execution. These resources
help make our life increasingly intelligent and convenient,
while their vulnerability to unauthorized access puts our
property and safety in danger [3]–[5].
Access control has been regarded as an effective solution
to prevent unauthorized resource access and has found var-
ious applications in smart cities [6], [7]. One typical and
specific example is the access control in smart healthcare,
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where access to electronic health records of citizens is strictly
controlled to avoid leakage and misuse of private information
[8]. Another example is the access control in smart building,
where electronic locks and keys form a smart access control
system [9]. Each smart key stores permissions to open a list of
locks. Apart from smart healthcare and smart building, access
control has also found applications in other systems, like smart
parking and logistics [10]. To summarize, access control plays
a significantly important role in securing various aspects of
smart cities.
Each sub-system in smart cities, like health, education and
transportation, has its own access control system. As a result,
it is extremely difficult to implement conventional centralized
and unified access control in smart cities, as the centralized
access control server can easily become a bottleneck [11]–
[16]. Also, the server itself turns out to be a single point of
failure and would sabotage the whole access control system
once it is destroyed by man-made or natural disasters. More
importantly, centralization renders the access control system
vulnerable to attacks, since attackers may easily compromise
the whole system by attacking the server only. As per above,
access control in smart cities needs to be decentralized and
trustworthy (i.e., robust to attacks) to cope with the large-scale
and distributed nature.
Apart from being decentralized and trustworthy, access con-
trol in smart cities also needs to be dynamic. This means that
access control systems should be able to automatically adapt
to the dynamically changing access context information, like
time, location and situations. For example, normally permitted
access to a smart building should be prohibited when the
building is in a fire accident. Access to an electronic health
record should be restricted to requests from only a certain IP
address scope. If the IP address is beyond the scope, the access
request must be denied.
Another critical requirement of access control in smart cities
is that it must be sufficiently fine-grained to achieve high
flexibility and accuracy. For example, in a smart healthcare
scenario, a general policy may be ”Doctors can view the
record of Patient A.” However, this policy is too coarse
to accurately control the access requests, because there are
different types of doctors and maybe only a certain type
(e.g., psychiatrists) is allowed to view the record, or even
more strictly, only the psychiatrists in charge of Patient A can
view the record. Smart cities usually contain various objects
(i.e., resources to be accessed) with different access control
requirements and subjects (i.e., entities sending access request)
with different attributes. Thus, fine-grained is one of the must-
satisfy requirements for the access control in smart cities.
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2In light of the above, this paper aims to design a decen-
tralized, trustworthy, dynamic and fine-grained access control
scheme to prevent unauthorized access to IoT resources in
smart cities.
B. Research Methods
Although traditional distributed access control schemes
(e.g., [17] and [18]) are able to meet the distributed require-
ment, they can hardly guarantee the trustworthiness. This
motivates researchers to apply the highly promising blockchain
technology for decentralized and trustworthy access control
[1], [19]–[36]. Blockchain, at its core, is a distributed database
managed over a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network [37], [38]. The
integrity and authenticity of data are verified by the majority
of the network nodes, thus creating a tamper-resistant database.
Current blockchain realizations like Ethereum [38] also sup-
port distributed and tamper-resistant computing through the
introduction of smart contract functionality. Thus, by storing
access control policies and implementing access control logic
on the blockchain, we can achieve decentralized and trustwor-
thy access control for smart cities.
Classical access control models mainly include Access
Control List (ACL), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
Capability-Based Access Control (CapBAC) and Attribute-
Based Access Control (ABAC), among which ABAC is the
most promising one to achieve dynamic and fine-grained
access control. This is because ABAC introduces context
information and also the attributes of subject and objects into
its access control policies. By adding more subject attributes,
object attributes and context information into policies, we can
greatly improve the dynamicity and granularity of ABAC.
In addition to dynamicity and fine granularity, ABAC offers
several other advantages in smart cities. First, ABAC enables
more accurate access control in smart cities than other mod-
els by including sufficient attributes. Second, ABAC enables
access control from a larger set of subjects to a larger set
of objects without specifying individual relationships between
each subject and each object. Third, ABAC reduces the burden
of maintenance, as access policies can be changed by simply
changing the attribute values without the need to change the
underlying subject-object relationships.
Motivated by the benefits of the blockchain technology and
ABAC model, we propose a novel blockchain-based ABAC
framework in this paper. Each ABAC policy is responsible
for the access control between a set of objects and a set
of subjects, i.e., many-to-many access control. The core idea
of the proposed framework is to store the attributes, policies
and access control logic in smart contracts. More specifically,
the proposed framework consists of one Policy Management
Contract (PMC), one Subject Attribute Management Contract
(SAMC), one Object Attribute Management Contract (OAMC)
and one Access Control Contract (ACC). The SAMC, OAMC
and PMC are used to store and manage (e.g., update, add and
delete) the attributes of subjects, the attributes of objects and
the ABAC policies, respectively. When receiving the access
request from a subject, the ACC retrieves the corresponding
policy, subject attributes and object attributes from the PMC,
SAMC and OAMC, respectively, to perform the access control.
A prototype system on a local private Ethereum blockchain
network was constructed to demonstrate the feasibility of the
proposed framework. Extensive experiments were conducted
to evaluate the monetary cost of the proposed framework.
Comparisons with the existing ACL-based framework in [26]
are also conducted to show the superiority of our framework.
C. Contributions and Innovation
Some recent work has been done to investigate blockchain-
based ABAC. The authors in [19] proposed a smart contract-
based ABAC scheme, which stores the URLs of policies on the
blockchain while leaving the policies themselves in external
databases. To access an object, subjects send the URL of the
corresponding policy to a smart contract, which then retrieves
the policy from the external databases and performs the access
control. Although the storage overhead can be reduced to some
extent by storing only the policy URLs on the blockchain,
the policies face a high risk of being falsified, which may
result in untrustworthy access control. Besides, the authors
provided no implementations to verify the feasibility of the
scheme. To address this issue, the authors in [20] proposed a
new ABAC scheme, which stores the policies and attributes
in smart contracts to achieve trustworthy access control. In
[21], instead of storing policies in smart contracts, the authors
transfer each policy into a smart contract. Although these
two schemes demonstrate the feasibility of blockchain-based
ABAC schemes, they follow the same idea of one-to-many
access control, i.e., each policy is associated with one object
and responsible for the access requests of many subjects. This
may incur a huge burden of policy management, especially in
large-scale IoT systems like smart cities.
Compared with existing blockchain-based ABAC schemes,
the proposed ABAC framework have the following major
contributions and innovation.
• Compared with [19], the proposed ABAC framework can
greatly improve the trustworthiness by storing ABAC
policies and attributes instead of their URLs on the
blockchain. In addition, the proposed ABAC framework
follows the standard XACML architecture [39], while
the framework in [19] does not. More importantly, we
provide implementations and experiments to illustrate the
feasibility and performances of the proposed framework.
• The idea of the proposed ABAC framework differs
greatly from the one in [21], where each policy has to
be hardcoded into a smart contract. This incurs a huge
burden of coding when a large number of policies need
to be added. In our framework, this can be easily realized
by simply adding the policies into the blockchain without
any coding.
• The most relevant framework is the one in [20], which
also follows the idea of storing policies, attributes and
logic on the blockchain. The main difference is that each
policy in [20] enables only one-to-many access control,
while our policies enables many-to-many access control.
This can greatly reduce the burden of policy management
and also storage cost, especially in smart cities with a
huge amount of subjects and objects.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the related work and Section III presents
the proposed framework. We provide the implementation in
Section IV, the monetary cost evaluation in Section V and
finally conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Blockchain Technology
The blockchain technology, the core of modern cryptocur-
rency systems like the Bitcoin [37], is essentially a distributed
database managed over a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network. All
peers in the network maintain the same copy of the blockchain
and synchronize to update the blockchain. A blockchain con-
sists of a sequence of blocks, each containing a collection of
transactions recording the remittance information (e.g., sender,
receiver and amount). These blocks are chained together by
each storing the cryptographic hash of its previous block. The
hash of a block is generated by a process called mining, which
requires a huge amount of calculations. Suppose an attacker
manages to tamper with the transactions in a certain block, he
has to re-calculate the hash values of this block and also its
subsequent blocks. This is considered impossible in general
and thus makes blockchain a tamper-resistant database.
Although originally developed as a distributed database,
blockchain has currently advanced to a distributed computing
platform thanks to the emergence of a new functionality called
smart contract. The most representative realization of such
novel blockchain is the Ethereum [38]. An Ethereum smart
contract is an executable program, which, like transactions, is
also stored (indirectly) on the blockchain. A smart contract
consists of variables as its states and functions called Appli-
cation Binary Interfaces (ABIs) to view and change the states
[40]. To execute a smart contract, a transaction needs to be
fired and broadcast to the P2P network. All peers receiving
this transaction will execute the smart contract to ensure the
validity of execution results. Thus, by implementing the smart
contract functionality, the blockchain technology can further
achieve distributed and tamper-resistant computing.
B. Blockchain-based Access Control
To deal with the access control issue in a smart home, a
Bitcoin-like blockchain was adopted in [22] to design an ACL-
based access control scheme. A blockchain was implemented
locally in each home to maintain an ACL, where each entry
corresponds to an internal object and records the allowed
access rights of a subject (internal or external). The access
control inside each home is performed by an internal miner,
which acts as the gateway to receive access requests from
subjects. However, the existence of the miner results in cen-
tralized access control inside each home. Besides, the mining
process is eliminated by the miner, which makes tampering
with the ACL possible and thus results in untrustworthy access
control. Based on the Bitcoin blockchain, the authors in [23]
proposed an ABAC scheme, which stores ABAC policies in
Bitcoin transactions and serves as a policy repository for
existing ABAC solutions. To update the policy inside a certain
transaction, administrators can append to the transaction a new
transaction with updated information. In addition, administra-
tors can simply spend the coins contained in a transaction
to delete the policy inside the transaction. The authors in
[24] proposed a similar Bitcoin-based ABAC scheme, while
the policies are encrypted for privacy and security, which is
different from [23]. A Bitcoin-based CapBAC scheme was
designed in [25], which stores capability tokens (i.e., special
data structures that record the assigned access rights of a
certain subject to one or more objects) in Bitcoin transactions.
A subject can transfer his/her capability token to another
subject through transactions, which is similar to the transfer
of bitcoins. When accessing an object, subjects must prove
their ownership of the corresponding capability tokens (i.e.,
the access rights) to the object owner.
The above schemes are all based on the Bitcoin-like
blockchains, while smart contract-based access control has
attracted more attention recently. For example, the authors in
[26] applied Ethereum smart contracts to store ACLs in order
to propose an ACL-based access control framework. In the
framework, each subject-object pair uses one smart contract
to implement the related access control. When accessing an
object, a subject sends a transaction, which contains the
required access information, to execute the corresponding
smart contract. After the execution, the smart contract will
automatically return the results (denial or permission) to
both the subject and object. However, since one contract
is responsible for the access control of only one subject-
object pair, this scheme suffers from heavy monetary cost
of deploying contracts, especially in large-scale IoT systems.
The authors in [27] extended the above framework with slight
modification. The authors in [28] proposed a CapBAC scheme,
which applies a smart contract to store the capability tokens
and capability delegation tokens that record the delegation
information among the subjects. These tokens are managed in
a tree form and serve as tamper-resistant references to help
object owners decide whether a subject has certain access
rights. This scheme was extended in [29], where the authors
used a delegation graph to replace the delegation tree in [28].
In addition, the authors designed only one type of tokens rather
than two types. The authors in [30] also proposed a CapBAC-
like scheme to manage access control for data sharing in
IoT systems, where oracles are used to connect blockchain,
data hosts, and users for data accessing. Another CapBAC-
like scheme was proposed in [31] for handling the access
control in information-centric networks. In [32], an RBAC
scheme was designed, where a smart contract was deployed to
maintain the roles assigned to each user in an RBAC model,
such that any service provider can verify the users’ ownership
of roles when providing services. An ABAC scheme was
proposed in [19], where the URL links of ABAC policies
are stored on the blockchain. In addition, a smart contract
is deployed to receive access requests from the subjects and
then perform the access control. However, the main limitation
of this scheme is storing the policies and attributes in external
databases, which makes them vulnerable to tampering attacks.
As a result, the trustworthiness of the policies and the attributes
cannot be guaranteed. Besides, the authors did not provide
implementations, and thus the feasibility of the proposed
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Fig. 1. The proposed ABAC framework.
scheme is not clear. Another ABAC scheme was also proposed
in [33], while the object attributes were not considered and
only one-to-many access control was realized. Other ABAC
schemes were also proposed in [1], [20], [21] as introduced
in Section I.
Access control schemes based on other blockchain real-
izations have also been designed. For example, an ABAC
framework based on the permissioned Hyperledger Fabric
blockchain was proposed in [34], while, different from the
schemes in [1], [20], only the attributes are stored on the
blockchain and no smart contracts are used for processing
access requests. The authors in [35] combined attribute-based
encryption and blockchain to propose another ABAC-like
scheme based on a multi-layer blockchain architecture. In [36],
a conceptual design of blockchain-based ABAC was provided,
while the authors provided no implementations.
III. PROPOSED ABAC FRAMEWORK
A. Smart Contract System
Fig. 1 illustrates the proposed ABAC framework, which is
composed of four smart contracts, i.e., SAMC, OAMC, PMC
and ACC. The SAMC, OAMC and PMC are used to store and
manage (e.g., update, add and delete) the attributes of subjects,
the attributes of objects and the ABAC policies, respectively.
The ACC performs the access control by interacting with the
other three smart contracts. This paper considers a smart cam-
pus scenario as part of a smart city. Note that the application
of the framework is not limited to smart campus but can be
extended to the whole smart city by properly defining the
policies and attributes. We introduce the details of the four
smart contracts in what follows.
1) Subject Attribute Management Contract (SAMC): The
SAMC is responsible for the storage and management of the
subject attributes in the smart campus. The SAMC is usually
deployed by the administrators of subjects on the blockchain
and only the administrators have permissions to execute it.
In the case of a smart campus, the administrators can be the
executive office if the subjects are students and staffs, while
TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT ATTRIBUTES
SubjectList[0x3d03...] ObjectList[0x272a...]
Name:“Alice” Name: “Camera”
Org.: “NAIST” Org. “NAIST”
Dep.: “IS” Dep.: “IS”
Lab.: “LSM” Lab.: “LSM”
Role: “student” Place: “Room1”
Others: “” Others: “”
if the subjects are IoT devices, the administrators can be their
owners. To distinguish between different subjects in the sys-
tem, each of them is assigned a unique identifier (i.e., ID). In
addition, each ID is linked with multiple attributes to indicate
that the subject with that ID possesses those attributes. We use
Ethereum account addresses (e.g., the 0x3d03... in Table I) as
such ID information throughout this paper. Table I shows some
examples of the subject attributes, such as the organization
Org. (e.g., Nara Institute of Science and Technology: NAIST),
department Dep. (e.g., Information Science: IS) and laboratory
Lab. (e.g., Large-scale Systems Management: LSM) to which
the subject belongs as well as the Role (e.g., student and
staff) of the subject. In addition to the storage of the subject
attributes, the ABIs of subjectAdd() and subjectDelete() are
also provided to add/update and delete the subject attributes,
respectively.
2) Object Attribute Management Contract (OAMC): Sim-
ilar to the SAMC, the role of the OAMC is storing and
managing the attributes of the objects, which can be ex-
ecuted only by the object administrators. Each object also
has multiple attributes linked with its ID, i.e., an Ethereum
account address (e.g., the 0x272a... in Table I) in this paper.
This paper considers some examples of the object attributes
in Table I, including the organization Org. (e.g., NAIST),
department Dep. (e.g., IS) and laboratory Lab. (e.g., LSM) to
which the object belongs as well as the Place (e.g., Room1)
where the object is placed. In addition to the storage of the
object attributes, the ABIs of objectAdd() and objectDelete()
are also provided to add/update and delete the object attributes,
respectively.
3) Policy Management Contract (PMC): The PMC is re-
sponsible for the storage and management of the ABAC
policies defined in this paper. Similar to the SAMC and
OAMC, only the administrators (e.g., the object owners) of
the policies have permissions to execute the PMC. A policy
is a combination of a set SA of subject attributes, a set
OA of object attributes, a set A of actions and a set C of
context information. This combination states that the subjects
with attributes in SA can perform the actions in A on the
objects with attributes in OA under the context in C. For
simplicity, we adopt time as the simple context information for
dynamic access control in this paper. We use three parameters
to represent time, which are Mode, startTime and endTime. The
Mode parameter indicates whether dynamic access control is
used. If the Mode is set to 0, dynamic access control is not
applied. If the Mode is set to 1, dynamic access control is
applied and the parameters startTime and endTime need to be
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EXAMPLE OF AN ABAC POLICY.
Subject Attributes Object Attributes Action Context
Name: “” Name: “” Read: True Mode: 1
Org.: “NAIST” Org.: “NAIST” Write: True startTime:
Dep.: “IS” Dep.: “IS” Execute: False 1563206776
Lab.: “LSM” Lab.: “LSM” endTime:
Role: “Student” Place: “” 1575483330
further specified to indicate the start time and end time of the
allowed access session. That is, access is allowed only if it is
during the period between the startTime and endTime.
Table II shows an example of the ABAC policy defined
in our framework with SA = {Org.: NAIST, Dep.: IS, Lab.:
LSM, Role: Student}, OA = {Org.: NAIST, Dep.: IS, Lab.:
LSM}, A = {Read, Write} and C = {Mode: 1, startTime:
1563206776, endTime: 1575483330}. Note that the startTime
and endTime are expressed in unixtime format in this example,
which correspond to 5/24/2019 12 : 00 and 5/31/2019 11 :
59, respectively. The policy states that any student belonging
to the LSM laboratory of the IS department of the NAIST
organization can read and write any object at any place of
the same laboratory of the same department and organization
for a specified period of time between 5/24/2019 12 : 00 and
5/31/2019 11 : 59. Unlike the policies in [20], the policies
in our framework are not associated with certain subjects
or objects. Thus, each policy can handle the access control
between multiple objects and multiple subjects, achieving
many-to-many access control. As a result, policy search is
required for the processing of access requests from subjects.
The policies are stored as a list structure in the PMC
and managed by the ABIs of policyAdd(), policyDelete() and
policyUpdate(), respectively. In addition, the ABIs of findEx-
actMatchPolicy() and findMatchPolicy() are also provided for
searching policies. We will introduce these two types of policy
search in Section III-B2 in greater details.
4) Access Control Contract (ACC): The core of the access
control system is the ACC, which is responsible for controlling
the access requests from the subjects to the objects. To execute
the ACC, a transaction that contains the required request
information (e.g., subject ID, object ID and actions) must be
sent to the accessControl() ABI. When the ACC receives the
transaction, it will retrieve the corresponding subject attributes,
object attributes and the policy from the SAMC, OAMC and
PMC, respectively. Based on the attributes and policy, the ACC
decides if the subject is allowed to perform the requested
actions on the object. Finally, such decision results will be
returned to both the subject and object for reference. We will
introduce the access control flow in Section III-B4 in greater
details.
B. Main Functions of the Framework
The proposed ABAC framework provides the following
main functions.
1) Adding, Updating and Deleting Subject/Object At-
tributes: As mentioned in Section III-A, the basic functions
provided by the proposed ABAC framework are adding,
updating and deleting the attributes of the subjects/objects.
For example, to add/update the attributes of a subject, the
subject administrator can send a transaction, which contains
the subject’s ID and the attributes to add/update, to the
subjectAdd() ABI of the SAMC. If the ABI finds a matched
entry for the presented subject ID in the subject list, it will
update the attributes of the subject. Otherwise, the ABI will
create a new entry for the subject ID in the subject list. When
deleting some attributes of a subject, the subject administrator
can send another transaction, which contains the subject’s ID
and attributes to delete, to the subjectDelete() ABI. Examples
of adding, updating and deleting the attributes of an object are
quite similar to the above ones and are thus omitted here.
2) Searching Policies: Because the PMC stores the poli-
cies as a list (i.e., array), we need policy search to delete,
update and retrieve a certain policy. The proposed ABAC
framework provides the ABIs of findExactMatchPolicy() and
findMatchPolicy() to implement two patterns of policy search,
respectively, i.e., search by complete match and search by
partial match.
• Search by Complete Match: This policy search pattern
returns the policies with subject and object attributes
exactly matching the subject and object attributes pro-
vided by the transaction sender. For example, when a
transaction sender searches for the policy as illustrated
in Table II, he/she needs to provide exactly the same
attribute information as listed in Table II. This search
pattern is mainly used for deleting policies.
• Search by Partial Match: Differing from the previous
policy search pattern, this pattern returns a list of indices
of the policies, in which the subject and object attributes
are subsets of those provided by the transaction sender.
Suppose a transaction sender executes this search by
offering a set SA of subject attributes and a set OA of
object attributes. Taking SA and OA as inputs, the search
will return any policy whose subject attribute set SA′ and
object attribute set OA′ satisfy the conditions SA′ ⊆ SA
and OA′ ⊆ OA. The reason is that any found policy can
handle the access request from the subjects with attribute
set SA to the objects with attribute set OA. This search
pattern is mainly used for adding/updating policies and
access control by the ACC.
3) Adding, Updating and Deleting Policies: A policy is
defined as a logical combination of subject attributes, object
attributes, actions and contexts. In general, policy administra-
tors can define more fine-grained policies by including more
attributes, thus achieving more flexible and dynamic access
control. Similar to the attribute management, this framework
also provides functions for policy management, including
adding, updating and deleting policies. When adding a new
policy, the policy administrator first needs to execute the policy
search by partial match (i.e., findMatchPolicy()) to find the
similar policies. When any similar policies are returned, the
administrator then needs to ensure that the new policy to add
does not conflict with any of the returned similar policies. Any
possible conflicts must be resolved by the administrator. After
the conflict resolution, the policy is finally added to the policy
list by the administrator through the policyAdd() ABI of the
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Fig. 2. Access control process.
PMC.
Similarly, to update a policy, the administrator also needs
to apply the search by partial match to find the target policy.
Note that other similar policies will also be returned by the
search as well. Conflicts (if any) between the new policy
used for update and the similar policies must be resolved,
after which the target policy is then replaced by the new
one through the policyUpdate() ABI. Note that when existing
policies cover the new ones to add/update, adding/updating
policies is not required, which can reduce the monetary cost
and the storage overhead of the framework. Different from
adding/updating policies, the policy administrator needs to
apply the policy search by complete match to find the target
policy, when deleting a policy. If the target policy is found, the
administrator then deletes it from the policy list by executing
the policyDelete() ABI.
4) Access Control: Access control is the core function
of the proposed ABAC framework. To illustrate the typical
access control flow, we show in Fig. 2 a subject Alice with
attributes Role: Student, Dep: IS and Org: NAIST (i.e., a
student belonging to the IS department of NAIST) wishes to
access an object camera with attributes Place: Room1, Dep:
IS and Org: NAIST (i.e., an object located in Room 1 of the
IS department of NAIST). We introduce the steps of the flow
in greater details as follows:
• Step 1: Alice sends an access request to the ACC by
sending a transaction, which contains her ID, the object
ID and the actions to perform, to the accessControl() ABI.
• Step 2: The ACC retrieves the subject (resp. object)
attributes from the SAMC (resp. OAMC) by sending a
message containing the subject (resp. object) ID to the
getSubject() (resp. getObject()) ABI.
• Step 3: The SAMC and OAMC return the correspond-
ing subject attributes and object attributes to the ACC,
respectively.
• Step 4: The ACC sends a message, which contains the
attributes of the subject and object, to the getPolicy ABI
of the PMC to query the related policies.
Blockchain
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Remix
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mining and 
deploy contracts
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and get result monitor ACC
Fig. 3. Software used in the proposed framework.
• Step 5: The PMC applies the policy search by partial
match to search the related policies and returns the found
policies to the ACC.
• Step 6: Based on the returned policies as well as the sub-
ject attributes, object attributes and context information
(e.g., time), the ACC determines if the subject has rights
to perform actions on the object.
• Step 7: The ACC returns the access results to both the
subject and object.
5) Dynamic Access Control: This framework implements
simple dynamic access control based on the time-related
variables of Solidity. By checking the Mode parameter in
the context field of the policy, the ACC determines whether
dynamic access control will be executed. If the mode is 0,
dynamic access control is not required and the ACC performs
the access control solely based on the action field of the policy.
If the mode is set to 1, the ACC then performs dynamic
access control based on the fields of action and context. More
specifically, the ACC obtains the current time using the now
variable provided by the Solidity and check if the inequality
startT ime ≤ now ≤ endT ime holds. If the answer is yes,
the request passes the dynamic control. Otherwise, the request
will be denied.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
To implement the proposed ABAC framework, we used
the geth client [41] to set up three Ethereum nodes on a
local server (Intel Xeon CPU E5-1620 3.60 GHz, 32 GB
memory), such that a private Ethereum blockchain network
can be constructed as shown in Fig. 3. One node plays the role
of the miner of the blockchain network and the other two serve
as the subject and object, respectively. We used the the Remix
[42], a browser-based Integrated Development Environment
(IDE), to edit and compile the four smart contracts of the
proposed framework. Since the Remix IDE can be configured
to connect to any of the three nodes via a Remote Procedure
Call (RPC) connection, we used the Remix IDE to deploy
7Fig. 4. Result of valid access (action: read).
Fig. 5. Result of invalid access (action: execute).
the four smart contracts on the private blockchain. To interact
with the nodes, we also created JavaScript programs using
the web3.js package [43], which can be used for sending
transactions and viewing the access result at both the subject
and object sides.
Based on the deployment, we conducted experiments to
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed framework. During
the experiments, we adopted the attributes in Table I as the
subject and object attributes and also used the policy in Table
II for the access control. We can see from Tables I and II that
the subject can only perform the read and write actions on the
object. We show in Fig. 4 (resp. Fig. 5) the results of the case
where the subject sends a read (resp. execute) request. The
outputs in both figures contain various information, including
the address of the ACC, the hash of the access request
transaction sent by the subject, the hash of the block where the
access request transaction is stored, the address (i.e., ID) of the
subject and the access results. The results in these two figures
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed ABAC framework.
V. COST EVALUATION
The system administrators need to pay some money (also
known as transaction fee) to deploy smart contracts on the
blockchain and execute the ABIs of these contracts. Ethereum
uses a unit called gas to measure the amount of operations
needed to perform a task, e.g., deploying a smart contract or
executing an ABI. In general, the more complex a task is, the
more gas it consumes. Like the gas at gasoline stations, gas
in Ethereum also has price, which varies with time. A higher
gas price usually makes transactions mined faster. Thus, as
shown in the following expression, the money required for
performing a task, denoted by TxFee, is the product of the
amount of consumed gas, denoted by gas, and the gas price,
denoted by gasPrice.
TxFee = gas× gasPrice× 10−9. (1)
Note that the TxFee has the unit Ether, and gasPrice has
the unit Gwei. Thus, the term 10−9 in the above equation is
needed for unit conversion. Unless otherwise stated, we set
the gasPrice to 8 Gwei.
In general, the gas cost comes from three aspects, which
are code cost denoted by codeCost, storage cost denoted by
storageCost and initial cost denoted by initCost. The code
TABLE III
PARAMETERS AND THEIR MEANINGS
variable definition
As Maximum number of subject attributes
Ao Maximum number of object attributes
Cs Maximum number of characters in one subject attribute
Co Maximum number of characters in one object attribute
l Length of the policy list
n The number of policies to add
m the number of subject-object pairs
cost is related to the complexity of the code executed by the
transaction. The more complex the code is, the higher the
code cost will be. The storage cost is the gas consumption for
modifying the storage of the smart contract, such as addition,
deletion and modification of data. More storage modification
incurs higher storage cost. Finally, the initial cost represents
the gas consumed when some ABIs are executed for the first
time. Thus, the gas consumption can be expressed as
gas = codeCost+ storageCost+ initCost. (2)
In this section, we will show the cost required to execute
each operation according to the flow of Section III-B, and
compare the cost required for access control of this framework
and that of the ACL-based framework in [26], including the
deployment cost for deploying smart contracts and operating
cost during the running of the access control frameworks.
We first estimate the expression of the gas consumption of
each operation based on (2) and then obtain the parameters
inside the expressions from experimental results. Table III
summarizes the parameters used in this section and their
meanings.
A. Cost of Each ABI
1) Adding, Updating and Delete Attributes:
• Adding the attributes of a subject: The subjectAdd() ABI
is executed to add the attributes of a subject to the
subjectList. Because the subjectAdd() ABI will modify
the storage (i.e., the subjectList) of the smart contract,
the gas cost depends on the number of attributes as well
as the number of characters in an attribute. Denoting the
maximum number of attributes of a subject by As and the
maximum number of characters allowed in one subject
attribute by Cs, the upper bound on the gas cost of adding
subject attributes can be expressed as
GSA = 64×As × Cs + SA(As), (3)
where SA(As) represents the codeCost depending on
As, 64 represents the cost for adding one character
and 64 × As × Cs represents the storageCost. In our
experiment, we set As = 6, which results in SA(As) =
151, 250.
• Updating a subject attribute: The subjectUpdate() ABI is
executed to rewrite a subject attribute in the subjectList.
The gas cost of this ABI also depends on the number
of characters in the newly input attribute, which can be
expressed as
GSU = 61, 250 + 64× Cs, (4)
8where 61, 196 represents the codeCost and 64 × Cs
represents the storageCost.
• Deleting a subject attribute: The subjectDelete() ABI is
executed to delete an attribute of a subject from the
subjectList, which depends only on the codeCost and
thus consumes a constant amount of Gas, about 26, 786
in our experiments.
• Adding the attributes of an object: The objectAdd() ABI
is executed to add the attributes of an object to the
objectList on the blockchain. Similar to the subjectAdd()
ABI, the objectAdd() ABI will modify the storage (i.e.,
the objectList) of the smart contract, and thus the gas cost
depends on the number of attributes as well as the lengths
of the attributes to add. Denoting the maximum number
of attributes of an object by Ao and the maximum number
of characters allowed in one object attribute by Co, we
can obtain the upper bound on the gas cost of adding an
object attribute as
GOA = 64×Ao × Co +OA(Ao), (5)
where OA(Ao) represents the codeCost depending on
Ao and 64 × Co represents the storageCost. In our
experiment, we set Ao = 6, which results in OA(Ao) =
151, 228.
• Updating an object attribute: The objectUpdate() ABI is
executed to rewrite the object attribute in the objectList.
Similar to the subjectUpdate() ABI, the gas cost of the
objectUpdate() ABI depends on the number of characters
in the newly input attribute, which is upper bounded by
GOU = 61, 228 + 64× Co, (6)
where 61, 228 represents the codeCost and 64 × Co
represents the storageCost.
• Deleting an object attribute: The objectDelete() ABI is
executed to delete an attribute of an object from the
objectList, which, similar to the subjectDelete() ABI,
consumes a constant amount of codeCost, about 26, 808
in our experiments.
2) Adding, Updating and Deleting Policies:
• Adding a policy: The policyAdd() ABI is executed to add
a new policy to the policyList. Some initial processing is
required in this ABI, so it consumes some initial cost
when it is executed for the first time. In addition, this
ABI also uses some storage to store the policy. Thus, it
also consumes some storage cost, which varies with the
numbers of subject and object attributes as well as the
total number of characters in the policy. The following
equation expresses the upper bound on the gas cost of
adding a policy:
GPA = 213, 803 + 15, 000× (As +Ao) (7)
+64× (As × Cs +Ao × Co)
+15, 000× (As +Ao + 1)× 1firsttime,
where 213, 803 represents the codeCost, 15, 000×(As+
Ao) + 64 × (As × Cs + Ao × Co) represents the
storageCost and 1firsttime is the indicator function,
which equals 1 when the policyAdd() ABI is executed
for the first time.
• Updating a policy: The policyUpdate() ABI is executed
to rewrite the policy in the policyList, where the gas cost
depends on the number of characters of the newly input
policy. The upper bound on the gas cost of updating a
policy can be expressed as
GPU =

194, 337 + 64×
(As×Cs+Ao×Co), policy′s index = 0,
194, 401 + 64×
(As×Cs+Ao×Co), policy′s index ≥ 1,
(8)
where 64 × (As × Cs + Ao × Co) represents the
storageCost, 194, 337 and 194, 401 represent the
codeCost, which varies depending on the index of the
policy to update.
• Deleting a policy: The policyDelete() ABI is executed to
delete a policy from the policyList, which consumes a
constant cost, as expressed in the following equation.
GPD =
{
51, 529, policy′s index = 0,
51, 561, policy′s index ≥ 1. (9)
Note that the gas cost for deleting a policy varies depend-
ing on the index of the policy to delete.
3) Searching Policies:
• Searching a policy: The findPolicy() is the ABI for
searching the corresponding policy based on the attributes
of the subjects and objects required by the ACC. The gas
cost depends on the length and the contents of the policy
to be searched. Denoting the length of policyList by l, the
upper bound on the gas cost of searching a policy can be
expressed as
GFP (l) = 57, 495 + 4, 000× (As +Ao) (10)
+10, 518× l + 64× (As × Cs +Ao × Co),
where 57, 495 represents the codeGas, 4, 000 represents
the unit cost for searching with one subject attribute
or object attribute, 10, 518 represents the unit cost for
searching in a policy list of length one and 64 represents
the cost for searching one character. The As×Cs+Ao×
Co here denotes the maximum number of characters in
the policy.
• Adding multiple policies: Before adding a policy, a search
in the policy list is required to find if the policy has been
added. Thus, the gas cost for adding policies depend also
on the cost of searching policies, i.e., the GFP (l). When
n distinctive policies need to be added, the upper bound
9on the gas cost can be expressed as
n×GPA +
n∑
k=1
GFP (k)
=
n∑
k=1
GFP (k) + n×
(
213, 803 + 15, 000× (As +Ao)
+64× (As × Cs +Ao × Co)
+15, 000× (As +Ao + 1)× 1firsttime
)
= 5, 259n2+
(
276, 557+19, 000×(As+Ao) (11)
+128×(As×Cs+Ao×Co)
+15, 000× (As +Ao + 1)× 1firsttime
)
n.
4) Access control: In this access control framework, it is
necessary to execute five ABIs to conduct access control,
i.e., getSubject(), getObject(), findPolicy(), getPolicy() and
accessControl(). The cost required to execute each ABI is as
follows:
• getSubject(): When the ACC wants to obtain subject
attribute information from the SAMC, it executes the
getSubject() ABI. When this ABI is executed for the
first time, it is necessary to create a variable subject
in the ACC. Thus, an initCost of 15, 000 is required
as shown in the following equation, which expresses the
upper bound on the gas cost of the getSubject() ABI.
GGS = 59, 467 + 15, 000×As × 1first time, (12)
where 59, 467 represents the codeCost and 1first time is
an indicator function, which equals 1 if the getSubject()
ABI is executed for the first time and equals 0 otherwise.
• getObject(): The ACC executes the getObject() ABI to
obtain the object attribute information from the OAMC.
Like the getSubject() ABI, the getObject() ABI needs to
create a variable object in the ACC when it is executed
for the first time, so it costs an initCost of 15, 000. The
upper bound on the gas cost of the getObject() ABI is
GGO = 59, 201 + 15, 000×Ao × 1firsttime, (13)
where 59, 201 represents the codeCost.
• getPolicy(): After searching the corresponding policy with
the findPolicy() ABI, the ACC executes the getPolicy()
ABI to get the corresponding policy. The gas cost of this
ABI depends on whether the policy is found or not. If
the policy is found, 53, 215 gas is consumed. Otherwise,
46, 780 gas will be consumed.
• accessControl(): After obtaining the policy information,
access verification is performed using the accessControl()
ABI. In access verification, the context information in the
policy is compared with the action that the subject wants
to execute. Similar to the getPolicy() ABI, the required
gas varies depending on whether the policy is found or
not. If the policy is found, 26, 932 gas is consumed.
Otherwise, 26, 640 gas is consumed.
TABLE IV
DEPLOYMENT COST
Gas USD
ACL-based Scheme in [26] 2,809,093 2.9664
Proposed scheme 4,943,332 5.22016
B. Deployment Cost
The deployment cost represents the cost used for deploying
the smart contracts, i.e., the ACC, SAMC, OAMC and PMC,
when the proposed ABAC scheme is introduced to smart
cities. Since each smart contract is deployed independently
via a separate transaction, the amount of consumed gas can
be obtained directly from the gasUsed filed of the output of the
deployment transaction. For comparison, we also evaluated the
deployment cost of the ACL-based scheme in [26]. The gas of
the proposed scheme (resp. the scheme in [26]) is calculated
as the aggregate gas for deploying the ACC, SAMC, OAMC,
and PMC (resp. RC and JC). The deployment gas costs of both
schemes are summarized in Table IV. Also, we calculate the
deployment costs in US Dollars (USDs). To do this, we first
apply the equation in (1) to calculate the aggregate transaction
fees from the gas costs, which are in units of Ether. We then
convert the transaction fees in Ether to deployment costs in
USD based on the exchange rate between USD and Ether as
of 17:00 JST, March 31, 2020 [44].
Table IV shows that the proposed scheme consumes more
gas than the scheme in [26] at the initial deployment stage,
because more smart contracts need to be deployed in the
proposed scheme.
C. Operating Cost
This subsection evaluates the operating cost of the proposed
ABAC framework, i.e., the gas consumed during the operation
of the access control system. It is obvious that the operating
cost depends on the number of subjects and objects of the
concerned system. Thus, we first evaluate the cost when m
pairs of subjects and objects are added to the system at the
beginning of the system operation, i.e., right after the initial
deployment stage. Unless otherwise stated, both the maximum
numbers of subject and object attributes are set to 6, i.e., As =
Ao = 6. Also, the maximum numbers of characters in a subject
attribute and an object attribute are set to 10, i.e., Cs = Co =
10.
1) Operating Cost vs. Number of Subject-Object Pairs:
First, the attributes of these subjects and objects need to be
added. Note that the upper bound on the numbers of subjects
and objects are both m for m subject-object pairs. Second, the
policies corresponding to these pairs need to be added to the
policy list. Suppose the number of policies required by these
pairs is n, the upper bound on the cost of adding m pairs of
subjects and objects at the beginning of the system operation
is expressed as
GAP = m×(GSA+GOA)+n×GPA+
n∑
k=1
GFP (k),(14)
where m × (GSA + GOA) represents the cost for adding
attributes and n×GPA+
∑n
k=1GFP (k) stands for the cost for
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Fig. 7. Operating cost with more subject-object pairs.
adding policies, because before adding a policy, it is necessary
to perform a policy search to prevent duplicated policies.
In the ACL-based scheme in [26], one ACC as well as a
policy need to be deployed for each subject-object pair. Thus,
when m pairs of subject and objects are added to the system,
the operating cost is
GACLAP = m× (GACC +GP ), (15)
where GACC = 1, 706, 290 represents the cost for deploying
one ACC and GP = 238, 777 represents the cost for adding
one policy.
We further evaluate the impacts of the number of subject-
object pairs m on the operating cost. Fig. 6 shows a graph
of the administrator’s operating cost when m increases. We
consider six cases for the number of policies n required by
m subject-object pairs, i.e., n = m, n = m/2, n = m/3,
n = m/4, n = m/5 and n = m/m. The n = m/p here
means that one policy handles the access control of p pairs.
Note the case of n = m/m is the best case, where all the m
pairs share one policy. In other words, there is no need to add
more policies. Fig. 6 also shows the cost of the ACL-based
scheme in [26].
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Fig. 8. Operating cost when one policy is shared by more pairs.
When the number of subject-object pairs is less than 3,
the proposed scheme requires deploying four smart contracts,
leading to a larger deployment cost, so the administrator’s
operating cost is larger than that of the ACL-based scheme
in [26]. However, when the number of subject-object pairs is
3 or more, the ACC deployment in [26] has a larger impact
and thus the proposed scheme incurs a lower cost. We can also
see from Fig. 6 that as p, i.e., the number of pairs sharing a
policy, increases, the operating cost decreases. This is because
less policies need to be added, introducing less cost.
Fig. 7 illustrates the operating cost when m further increases
to 1000. We can see that the operating cost of the proposed
scheme increases quadratically as m increases. Thus, when
m exceeds some value, the proposed ABAC scheme will
introduce more operating cost than the ACL-based scheme
in [26]. For example, this value is about 214 for the case of
n = m, about 489 for the case of n = m/2 and about 761 for
the case of n = m/3.
Fig. 8 shows the behavior of administrator’s operating cost
versus the number of subject-object pairs m, when each policy
is shared by more pairs, i.e., when p is larger. As p increases,
the cost of our scheme decreases and finally approaches the
cost of the best case, i.e., p = m.
2) Operating Cost in Various Scenarios: We consider a
smart campus containing 1000 subjects, 150 objects and 100
policies. We assume each subject randomly and uniformly
chooses 15 objects to access. The maximum numbers of
subject and object attributes are set to 6, i.e., As = Ao = 6.
Also, the maximum numbers of characters in a subject attribute
and an object attribute are set to 10, i.e., Cs = Co = 10. We
consider the following two scenarios of access control in this
system.
• Scenario 1: Adding new objects
We consider the scenario of access control on two newly
equipped lights in a laboratory of 10 members including
staff and students. In this case, the attributes of the two
lights need to be added. If existing policies apply to the
new lights, no policies need to be added, which is the best
case. Otherwise, we need to add new policies as well. For
11
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF OPERATING COST (SCENARIO 1)
Gas USD
ACL-based Scheme in [26] 36,701,340 38.7567
Proposed scheme (Best) 310,136 0.32751
Proposed scheme (Worst) 16,163,226 17.07
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF OPERATING COST (SCENARIO 2)
Gas USD
ACL-based Scheme in [26] 8,257,801,500 8720.2
Proposed scheme (Best) 46,520,400 49.125
Proposed scheme (Worst) 113,438,512,500 119791.07
simplicity, we only consider the worst case where a new
policy is required for each subject-object pair. That means
the number of policies to add is the product of the number
of subjects and the number of the newly-added lights
(i.e., 2). On the other hand, if the ACL-based scheme
in [26] is used, we need to deploy one ACC and policy
for each subject-object pair. This means, the numbers of
policies and ACCs to add are the product of the number
of subjects and the number of the newly-added lights.
Table V shows the operating costs of both schemes, which
indicates that the proposed ABAC scheme outperforms
the one in [26] in terms of the gas cost.
• Scenario 2: Adding new subjects
This scenario shows the cost when 300 new members
join the university, which corresponds to the case where
300 subjects are newly added to an IoT system. First, the
attributes of the subjects need to be added. Second, If
existing policies apply to the new subjects, no policies
need to be added, which is the best case. Otherwise,
we need to add new policies as well. For simplicity,
we only consider the worst case where a new policy
is required for each subject-object pair. That means the
number of policies to add is the product of the number
of newly-added subjects and the number of the objects.
The operating cost of using the scheme in [26] is also
evaluated in this scenario. The numbers of policies and
ACCs to add are the product of the number of the newly-
added subjects and the number of the objects. Table
VI shows the operating costs of both schemes, which
indicates that the proposed ABAC scheme consumes
less gas than the one in [26] in the best case, while
it consumes more gas than the latter in the worst case,
which rarely happens in practice.
D. Discussions
Apart from the monetary cost, another major concern is
the throughput issue, i.e., the number of access requests that
can be processed per unit time (e.g. second). The through-
put of the proposed ABAC framework depends heavily on
the throughput (i.e., number of transactions included in the
blockchain per second) of the underlying blockchain systems.
We applied Ethereum 1.0 as the underlying blockchain system
in our implementation, the throughput of which is about 15
transactions per second [45]. In addition, the access request
processing unit ACC in our framework needs to communicate
with other contracts through messages, which further intro-
duces latency to the access control process and thus reduces
the throughput of the framework. One of the main reasons
behind the low throughput is the consensus algorithm. Our
implementation is based on the popular proof-of-work (PoW)
algorithm, which requires a huge amount of calculations
to add one block of transactions into the blockchain. Note
that the proposed framework is actually independent of the
underlying blockchain systems and consensus algorithms, as
long as the blockchain systems support smart contract-like
functionality. This means that the throughput of the proposed
framework can be improved by being implemented upon faster
blockchains. One promising solution is Ethereum 2.0, which
changes the consensus algorithm from PoW to proof-of-stake
(PoS) and adopts the technique of sharding to greatly improve
the throughput performance [46]. It is expected that Ethereum
2.0 will enable 64 to several hundred times more throughput
than Ethereum 1.0 [46]. Therefore, one future work is to
implement our framework on Ethereum 2.0 to improve its
throughput performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an ABAC framework for smart
cities by using Ethereum smart contracts to manage ABAC
policies, attributes of subjects and objects and perform access
control. A local private Ethereum blockchain network was
constructed to implement the proposed framework and demon-
strate its feasibility. Based on the implementation, we also
conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the monetary cost
of the proposed scheme in terms of gas consumption. First, we
evaluated the gas consumption of basic operations provided
by the framework, like access control and the management
of subjects, objects and policies. Second, we evaluated the
gas consumed by the system administrators for deploying the
proposed framework on the blockchain (i.e., deployment cost)
and running the framework after deployment (i.e., operating
cost). For comparison, we also evaluated the initial cost and
operating cost of an existing ACL-based framework. The
experiment results showed that although our framework in-
troduces a larger deployment cost than the ACL-based frame-
work, it introduces less operating cost in general, especially for
IoT systems containing a large number of subjects and objects
with common attributes. Smart cities are typical examples
of such systems. Although the prototype demonstrates the
feasibility of the proposed framework, it can hardly reflect
the performance of the framework in large-scale smart cities.
Thus, we will consider the implementation of the framework
in environments with larger scales as our future work.
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